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TRADE UNION ABUSES

T

RADE
unionism,
its proper
scope
and operation,
is a
technique
for the in
increase
of the
worker's
share of produced wealth and for the improvement of his working conditions and relations, and in its more progressive state, for
the promotion and safeguarding of the worker's welfare by
provision for non-employment and illness and by cooperative enterprises. The bases of the technique are organization
and the utilization of the power of concert of action; in its
early stages the concerted action is strike, in the more developed status it is collective bargaining, supported by the
threat or fear of strike as the coercive force.
Success in the employment of the technique results in
agreements between the union, on the one hand, and the
.employers, individually or acting through associations, on
the other. These agreements fix the rates of pay, prescribe
the hours and conditions of labor, bind the employer to employ only members of the union, limit his right to hire and
discharge them at will; provide against strike, on the one
hand, and lockout, on the other, during the term of the
contract and the other party's performance thereof, and contain such other conditions of mutual concern as the parties
agree upon.' Not infrequently, provision is made for impartial boards or chairmen to supervise the operation and
performance of the contract and to adjust disputes. 2 In
the matter of hiring and discharge, in those industries in
which the unions are most firmly established, the union has
ex parte control of the filling of the positions; that is, it assigns its members to the various positions and dictates their
tenure.
Obviously, success in the employment of the technique
vests in the officials of the union extensive power, not only
with respect to the employers but more so over their own
'See, for example, Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 215-218, 76 N. E. 5,
8-10 (1905); Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 310, 174 N. E. 690, 691, 73
A. L. R. 669 (1931); Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App. Div. 487, 194 N. Y.
Supp. 401 (1st Dept. 1922); Maisel v. Sigman, 123 Misc. 714, 724-726, 205
N. Y. Supp. 807, 815-817 (1924).
'See, for example, Schlesinger v. Quinto, supra note 1.
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members. The greater the success, the greater the power;
and, like all other power, it operates for good when exercised
by men of wisdom and conscience, and for evil when wielded
by the predatory or corrupt.
In so far as the power might be abused to the prejudice
of the employers, there are strong counter-balancing forces.
Employers, particularly when combined in associations,
are a class well equipped to take care of themselves and of
their interests. Economically, their power is certainly never
subordinate to that of the union, and equally the law affords
them a measure of protection. 3 Strategically they are the
ones with whom the union officials must come to, deal with,
and stay on good terms.
Quite different is the situation with respect to intraunion abuse of power. There it is a case of potent power
versus humble individual. This paper proposes to consider
what, if any, checks and balances there are on this power,
and what, if any, legal reforms should be brought about,
and questions cognate thereto.
At the very outset, it is perhaps pertinent to point out
that the problem here considered arises not until, and only
where, trade unionism attains its objective to a comparatively high degree. The problem does not arise except where
trade unionism is successful for two reasons: (1) while
trade unionism is struggling first for organization and then
to establish its power wth the employers, there is neither
time, opportunity nor incentive for inner exploitation, and
(2) the leadership at that stage is in persons of more or less
idealistic and missionary bent. It is only when power is
established and substantial treasuries are in existence that
"racketeers" deem it worth while to enter upon the scene.
Obviously, the problem is more and more acute in proportion to the extent of success. If the line of progress lies
in the extension of the trade union system, the problem here
considered must be solved. Otherwise, the lot of the individual worker, in many respects, will be even more intolerable than in pre-union times. Furthermore, the evils
See Steinkritz Amusement Corp. v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 294, 178 N. E. 11
(1931).
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which will hereafter be pointed out are a great obstacle to
the development of the trade union system, and if not
eradicated might lead to its collapse.
I.
ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP.

The problem begins in the matter of admission to membership in the unions. Where a trade is completely unionized, membership *inthe union is a condition precedent to
one's practice of that trade. The union, therefore, determines how many, and who, should take up that vocation.
If it were proposed, for example, that the legal profession
or the medical profession be afforded the right to keep persons out of the profession on a ground other than lack of
qualification, it is quite certain that such a proposal would
meet with *determined and almost universal condemnation.
Yet in the trades, in which trade unionism is successful,
the unions and, in some inprecisely that power resides in
4
stances, is exercised by them.
I am not arguing against the economic need or wisdom
of exclusion in order to prevent an unabsorbable oversupply. Such oversupplies, like overproduction, are grave
and difficult problems which, if solvable at all, call for the
application of genius. One need not be unsympathetic or
facetious to doubt that all successful trade unions are guided
by extraordinary personalities. At best, it is extremely
doubtful whether those who are already in, properly and
safely, may be entrusted with the power to determine how
many and who shall share in their monopolistic prerogatives. When it is realized that to leave the matter to the
"ins" is in reality to leave it to the individual, or small
group of individuals, who controls the organization of the
' Of course, in the absence of statute the courts have no authority to compel
a union or other association, corporate or voluntary, to admit an applicant to
membership, whatever be the injustice or hardship of exclusion. See McKane
v. Adams, 123 N. Y. 609, 25 N. E. 1057 (1890); Greenwood v. Building Trades
Council, 71 Cal. App. 159, 233 Pac. 823 (1925); Mayer v. journeymen Stonecutters' Association, 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 524, 20 Atl. 492, 494 (1890) ; Muller v.
Bricklayers' M. & P. Union, 6 N. J. Misc. Rep. 226, 140 Atl. 424 (1928).
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"ins," the peril becomes manifest. There is no safeguard
in such a situation against short-sighted selfishness, assuming the honesty and good will of the persons in control.
And since there is no reason for expecting impeccable integrity on the part of all labor leaders any more than in any
other activity of mankind, we must not overlook the opportunities for corruption that such situations present.
Perhaps it would be unwise to eliminate the power. In
the absence of a general scheme for the solution of the problem of oversupply, it may be unwise to prevent unions from
exercising some substantial measure of control in that direction as far as their own several trades may be concerned,
however haphazard and crude and unrelated to the general
economic welfare such control is. But an unprincipled
monopoly in that respect is intolerable. While the complete
barring of new members from unions has a measure of economic justification, provided no favoritism or discrimination is exercised, the same cannot be said of other practices.
There are unions which exact very substantial initiation fees. The payment of 500 or $1,000 or even $2,000
may be a perfectly fair and proper exaction as an entry fee
to a golf or country club, but has no place in a union. That
is the last organization which should impose a property
qualification as a condition to membership. If overcrowding
of the trade is to be prevented, it should be done on a rational basis and not by a prohibitory monetary levy.
In several unions of which the writer knows, still another travesty is practiced. While some newcomers are admitted to membership, by far the greater number are in lieu
of membership given "permits" which entitle them to work
as union men in unionized shops. For the permit, and the
job he gets by reason of it, the holder of the permit is required to pay a substantial portion of his earnings into the
treasury of the union-in some unions 10% of his earnings
besides other assessments-but he has no right to attend
meetings and has no vote. The permit system obviously does
not avoid an oversupply of workers, and, therefore, lacks
the only economic justification for closing membership rolls.
It simply serves to exact from certain of the workers prohibitory levies and to impose upon them a status of sub-
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servience in that they are dependent for their jobs on the
favor and grace of the union officials who granted and who
may withdraw the permits.
A variant of the permit system is junior membership.
The juniors are as fully qualified for their vocation as the
seniors and fill the same jobs for the same pay, except that
they are entitled to jobs only after all the seniors are placed;
but they have no vote, may not even attend meetings, hold
no office, are ruled by the seniors, pay 10% of their earnings
as dues after an initiation fee of $500, and have no interest
in the union property.
The existence of such classes of unfranchised, underprivileged and overtaxed workers as an appendage to a union
is contrary to all principles of democracy and considerations
of expediency. It mocks the preachings of, and exhortations
to, "brotherhood" and workers' solidarity.
Such arrangements are prolific of evil under the best
of circumstances. And if perchance the officials in charge
be unscrupulous, what system could be more ideal for corruption?

FINES, SUSPENSIONS AND EXPULSIONS.

Closely related to the question of admission to membership .is the one of discipline of members-their fining, suspension and expulsion.
Unions are either voluntary associations or corporations. In either case they have the right to formulate their
own constitutions and by-laws, or other fundamental law.
Such fundamental law, as amended from time to time in
accordance with the provision for amendment therein contained, is held to be a contract between the individual member and his associates. 5 Included in the member's contract
'Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 177 N. E. 833 (1931); (1931)

6 ST.

JOHN'S L. REV. 143, cases cited in note 1, to wit: Strauss v. Thoman, 60 Misc.

72, 111 N. Y. Supp. 745, aff'd, 129 App. Div. 905, 113 N. Y. Supp. 1148 (1st
Dept. 1908); Ranken v. Probey, 131 App. Div. 328, 115 N. Y. Supp. 832 (3rd
Dept. 1909); Grassi Bros. v. O'Rourke, 89 Misc. 234, 153 N. Y. Supp. 493
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is also the obligation of "loyal support of the society in
the attainment of its proper purposes." 6
The constitution and by-laws of unions commonly
contain specific prohibitions and prescribe penalties for
transgressions thereof. Such prohibitions forbid: disorderly
conduct at meetings; being employed with non-members;
procuring or continuing employment other than in
the prescribed manner and upon the prescribed terms;
breach of a strike; "giving aid and comfort to the enemy";
and such other acts as experience has demonstrated, or
theory believes, to be harmful.
In so far as such regulations apply to conduct which subverts the fundamental aims of the association, it is clear that
the association should have the power to act so as to effectively restrain and deter such offenses by members. The
only concern of public policy in that respect is that proper
care be taken by the"association in the ascertainment of the
facts so that no innocent member should suffer by a mistaken or wrongful accusation and that the discipline administered be not unnecessarily harsh. The power is farreaching; its exercise to the extreme of expulsion may exclude the individual involved from his calling, which is
usually his only means of earning a livelihood, and thus
may consign him to years of idleness and his family to
starvation. Suspension for substantial periods works similar hardship. In the face of such grave consequences, it is
imperative that there be great care, caution and tolerance
in the exercise of the disciplinary power.
Union laws, however, frequently go beyond prescribing specific acts of obvious detriment. In many instances
they contain a general provision empowering the organization, or a tribunal within it, to impose such discipline as it
shall see fit for any conduct which it may deem injurious
or detrimental to the interests of the organization. 7 Some
(1915). Also In re Haebler v. N. Y. Produce Exchange, 149 N. Y. 414, 427,
44 N. E. 87, 91 (1896); Dingwall v. Amalgamated Ass'n, 4 Cal. App. 565,
88 Pac. 597 (1906).
Polin v. Kaplan, supra note 5, and cases therein cited. See also Brennan
v. United Hatters, 73 N. J.L. 729, 65 AtL. 165 (1906).
*See, for example, Havens v. King, 221 App. Div. 475, 224 N. Y. Supp.
193 (3rd Dept. 1927), affd, 250 N. Y. 617, 166 N. E. 346 (1929), where the
union's constitution authorized punishment of members "for misconduct and
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unions have or claim to have, anti lese-majeste statutes,
provisions against statements which defame or adversely
reflect upon the officers, irrespective of the motive or truth
of the attacks.8 Other provisions prohibit, or are claimed
to prohibit, resort to the courts of the land in matters affecting the union or .its officers or fellow-members.9 Still
other provisions are claimed to prohibit the voicing of individual views contrary to the stand officially taken by the

union, even where such views are stated in testimony given
under oath in response to a subpoena ' 0 or in a petition to

the legislature."

In short, some unions attempt to coerce

their members into a slavish conformity, in words and de-

meanor no less than in their acts, such as has been attempted
only by the church in the days of its darkest bigotry, and
by political depotisms in their days of worst tyranny.
Granted that the degree of individual liberty that should
be permitted in such a collective movement as a trade union
is not capable of dogmatic definition, sight must not be lost
violation of obligation" and also expulsion for "violating any of the duties of
membership, or any of the principles of the Brotherhood."
The Moving Picture Operators' Union of Greater New York, Local No.
306 of I. A. of T. S. E. and M. P. M. 0. of the U. S. and Canada, on May 20,
1931, adopted an amendment to its constitution reading as follows:
"Any member guilty of conduct detrimental, prejudicial or injurious
to the best interests of this Union and/or unbecoming a member of this
Union and/or tending to disrupt or disturb the harmony within the
organization, between its members or its officers, shall, if found guilty
by the Executive Board after trial as provided in Section One of this
Article, be punishable by fine or by suspension, or both, or by expulsion
or by such other penalties as the members of the Union at a regular
meeting duly convened may deem fit and proper to impose."
See Lateltin v. Kaplan, pending in Supreme Court, New York County; Tyborowski v. Kaplan, pending in Supreme Court, Kings County. See also People
ex rel. Holstrom v. Independent Dock Builders' Benevolent Union, 164 App.
Div. 267, 149 N. Y. Supp. 771 (1st Dept. 1914), where a by-law provided that
a member "Where act or acts are detrimental to the welfare of the Organization, whether direct or against an officer or member * * * shall be subject to
forfeiture of his * * * membership, or any action the body may see fit to take,
after a fair trial before the Executive Board or the body in session."
8In Polin v. Kaplan, su~pra note 5, it was claimed that there was a "minute
by-law" reading: "Any man or set of men convicted for sending out or distributing slanderous literature will be fined $500, or expulsion." See also
Wilcox v. Royal Arcanum, 210 N. Y. 370, 104 N. E. 624 (1914).
'See Burke v. Monumental Division, 273 Fed. 707 (D. C. Md. 1919);
Polin v. Kaplan, supra note 5.
1oSee Abdon v. Wallace, 165 N. E. 68 (Ind. App. 1929).
See Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 At. 70 (1921).
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of the fact that the inspiration and essence of the movement is promotion of individual weal, and, therefore, the
greatest possible tolerance should prevail. Of course, disloyalty in matters fundamental cannot be brooked, but beyond that, there should be free reign to individuality and
independence, except as that may be restrained by the harmonizing force of moral leadership.
If all labor unions were under the guidance of -ise and
benign men it would not matter how broad and indefinite
were the disciplinary laws. But, as has already been observed above, not unlike other institutions of mankind,
unions, generally, are controlled by the usual run of ordinary
mortals. Such mortals are subject to the usual passions,
vanities and other frailties of men. They dislike having
their acts and policies criticized or opposed, and may be so
angered by a constant critic as to desire his elimination.
They, at times, may be so antagonized by the word, deed or
attitude of a member as to arouse a determination to get
rid of him. Some of them are naturally of overbearing dispositions. Some become imbued with a military spirit and
come to regard themselves as generals at the head of armies,
which require that for the "good of the service" there be
complete unanimity and unquestioned accord with them on
the part of all the members. Still others, for a variety of
reasons (whether it be love of power or material gain, open
or illicit), like to become entrenched in their offices and
believe absolutism the best assurance of the perpetuation of
their power and emoluments.
It is to be expected, then, that great latitude in the
power to fine, suspend and expel should result in serious
abuses. Illustations are quite enlightening.
In one union in the City of New York, composed of
some 1,200 men, in the period between October, 1929 and
October, 1931, at least twelve members were expelled or suspended and fined. The cases of ten of them reached the
courts, and, therefore, can be accurately set forth. Six 12
See Polin v. Kaplan, stpra note 5; Schneider v. Kaplan, ibid.; Rubin and
Lanzette v. Kaplan, Smith v. Kaplan, and Wood v. Kaplan, all in Supreme
Court, Kings County. All these expulsions and fines have been held void and
were set aside.
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of the ten were expelled and fined $1,000 each, practically
at one time, simply because they had (1) cooperated in the
bringing of actions in the Supreme Court against the officers
of the union accusing them of wrongdoing against the union
and its members and, among other things, seeking to compel them to account for the hundreds of thousands of dollars
of union funds which had passed through their hands, and
(2) in connection with the actions had circularized their
fellow-members, explaining their action and their reasons
therefor, denouncing the officers, and appealing for cooperation. In the action for an accounting,"3 the plaintiff alleged that the funds of the union had not been handled by the
persons and in the manner prescribed by the constitution of
the organization, and further that reports and accountings
required by the constitution had not been rendered; and
these allegations were not denied. The court, in that
case, ordered a discovery and inspection of the books
and records of the officers. The officers filed an appeal from this order, 1 4 and then brought on the above
mentioned charges against the plaintiff and his associates. Under the constitution of the union, the charges,
being held "cognizable" at a meeting of the members, were
referred to the executive board for trial and report. The
executive board, in these instances, was composed exclusively
of the offended officials, all of whom were defendants in the
court actions which had been commenced by the accused
members and were the persons criticized in the "libelous"
circulars. The executive board determined and reported that
the commencement of the actions and the literature sent
out in connection therewith constituted violations of provisions of the constitution and of the "oath of obligation"
which each had taken upon his admission to membership.
At meetings of the union, the reports of the executive board
were concurred in. At first some of the accused were fined,
in one instance, the fines aggregated $5,000 (an outrageous
sum considering the fact that it was imposed on an un" Ruddock (later substituted by Polin, later substituted by Thide) v.
Kaplan, pending in Supreme Court, Queens County.
" Polin v. Kaplan, 230 App. Div. 784, 244 N. Y. Supp. 912 (2d Dept.

1930).
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propertied wage earner), some were suspended and others
were fined and suspended. But reconsiderations were had in
each case "upon advice of counsel" and the uniform penalty
that was finally imposed on each was a fine of $1,000 and
expulsion.
It is to be noted that no claim was made in the charges
against any of these men, and that the court actions were
groundless or predicated upon false allegations, or motivated
by malice or ulterior purposes. The claim simply was that
the members had no right to bring the matter into court
in any event, whatever were the merits or provocations, and
that if wrongs had been committed by the officers, the members' sole remedy was impeachment proceedings within the
union.
The accounting action reached a point where, the order
of discovery and inspection having been affirmed, 15 in order
to stave off the discovery and inspection, the officers of the
union took the position that the expulsion of the plaintiff
in the action brought about an abatement or suspension of
the suit. In an effort to avoid litigation of that point, two
other members, theretofore not associated with the litigation, came forward with an offer to be substituted as plaintiffs in the accounting action. One of these thereafter did
become the substituted plaintiff. Charges were then preferred against each of these two men. Against one of them
the charge was that his mere offer to become the plaintiff
in an action against its officers was a violation of the union's
constitution.'
The charge against the other was that he
had violated the union's constitution by becoming the substituted plaintiff.' 7 These charges also were tried by the executive board who reported that the members were guilty
as charged. Votes followed suspending each of the accused
for six months.
In the same union, there was an exchange of blows between a member and two other members at the union head' Ibid.
16See Gruber v. Kaplan, pending in Supreme Court, New York County
(injunction pendente lite granted).
. See Thide v. Kaplan, pending in Supreme Court, New York County
(injunction pendente lite granted).
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quarters. The former claimed that the latter two were the
aggressors and had assaulted him without any just cause or
provocation. He procured from the Magistrate's Court
summonses directed to his two alleged assailants, and upon
the return of the summonses testified before the Magistrate
to the assaults which he claimed had been committed by the
other two. The Magistrate dismissed the assault charges.
Thereupon one of the officers of the union preferred charges
against the complainant accusing him of "conduct detrimental, prejudicial and injurious" to the best interests of the
union, "and with conduct unbecoming a member thereof"
in that he had caused the issuance of the Magistrate's Court
summonses and testified to the alleged assaults, and in that
his testimony before the Magistrate was "false and untrue
and without any basis in fact," and in that .if the facts to
which he had testified were true, "charges" could have been
brought against the alleged assailants "within the union,
pursuant to the provisions of the constitution and by-laws."
These charges were held "cognizable" and referred to the
executive board, who, in turn, reported that the member
was guilty as charged. On that, the member was expelled
8
from the union.'
Another member of the union was a participant in another physical encounter with two others at the meeting
place of the union prior to the commencement of a meeting.
This member also procured a summons from the Magistrate's
Court, charging one of the other two with assault upon him,
and upon the return of the summons testified that he had
been assaulted by the defendant named in the summons. In
this case also, the Magistrate dismissed the charge. Thereafter, one of the officers of the union preferred charges
against the member substantially in the same form as those
outlined in the last paragraph except for the addition of
an allegation that the member was the assailant, and that
the assault itself as well as the subsequent court proceeding was detrimental, prejudicial and injurious to the best
interests of the union, and "unbecoming a member thereof."
8

See Lateltin v. Kaplan, pending in Supreme Court, New York County

(injunction pendente life granted).
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These charges took the course of those previously discussed,
and resulted in expulsion.' 9
In another union, four men were recently expelled for
no graver offense than that they, being junior members and
as such without franchise and barred from all participation
in the conduct of the union, met together with the other
juniors and decided to petition and agitate within the union
for the equality of the rights of all members, and thereafter
presented such a petition to the union and 2upon
denial
0
thereof attempted to appeal to the parent body.
Some twenty-seven years ago, the Erie Railroad, in the
exercise of a right reserved to it under its contract with its
engineers' union, ordered the engineers to run the Jersey
City-Port Jervis trains on to Susquehanna. The carrying
out of the order would greatly inconvenience the engineers,
and so at a meeting of their union they adopted a resolution of protest. The superintendent of the railroad, nevertheless, insisted upon the extension of the run and appealed
to the engineers to carry out their orders. Under these circumstances, one of the engineers, Fritz, although he had
voted for the resolution of protest and was personally opposed to the extension of the run, promised the superintendent that he would do the best he could. Thereafter
Fritz argued with his fellow-members that the railroad company was within its rights under the contract and that the
members were bound to comply with the company's orders
in the matter. He repeated this contention in a letter to
one of the superior officers of the Order. For this conduct,
charges were preferred against Fritz of violation of obligation in that he had offered his advice and service to the
officials in their proposed plan to run trains through from
Jersey City to Susquehanna "both before and after the protest of this division against this plan was entered." On
this charge, Fritz, although he had been a member of the
See Tyborowski v. Kaplan, pending in Supreme Court, Kings County

(injunction pendente lite granted).

' See Dulberger et al. v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees & Moving Picture Machine Operators of the U. S. and Canada,
Local 384, Hudson County, N. J., pending in Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
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union for over1 twenty years and had been chief of his local,
2
was expelled.
Some sixteen years ago, there was pending before the
Interstate Commerce Commission an investigation of the
advisability of adopting a particular type of headlight. One
of the railroads directed one of its engineers, Rother, to go
to Washington. Upon his arrival there, he was served with
a subpoena to appear before the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and
its Grand Chief Engineer, Warren S. Stone, were favoring
the adoption of the headlight. Nevertheless, Rother, answering questions put to him at the hearing, truthfully testified
to certain disadvantages inherent in the proposed headlight
' Fritz v. Knaub, 57 Misc. 405, 103 N. Y. Supp. 1003 (Sup. Ct., Orange
Co., 1907), aff'd, 124 App. Div. 915, 108 N. Y. Supp. 1133 (2d Dept. 1908), on
opinion of Mr. Justice Mills at Special Term. In the course of its opinion,
the court at Special Term said the following:
"I fail to see how such contention (the contention oilthe part of the
plaintiff that under the agreement between the company and the engineers, the company had the right to adopt the proposed plan and require
the engineers to run through to Susquehanna) could be regarded as
violating any of the rules of the Division or as being in any way disloyal
to his fellow members * * *. There is nothing in the evidence to show
that the resolution of the Division to protest against the proposed new
plan was based upon any contention that the company, under such an
agreement, had not the right to adopt it. The plaintiff, himself, voted
in the Division meeting for such protest, presumably upon the obvious
ground of the great hardship of the new plan to the engineers" (p. 414,
103 N. Y. Supp. at 1009).
"In the whole case I can see no substantial fault in the conduct of
the plaintiff-nothing of which his fellow members ought to complain.
The gist of his offending seems to have been merely that he took the
view that it was the duty of the engineers to obey the order of the
railroad officials, if given, to run through to Susquehanna, he taking this
view upon the ground that the contract between the company and the
engineers gave the company the right to give such order. Whether or
not this view of the effect of the contract be correct is still an open
question, as no tribunal in or out of the order has held to the contrary.
Until such a decision has been rendered, it would seem manifest that
every member of the order ought to be at liberty to hold and among his
fellows freely express his own opinion upon the question. Any rule
prohibiting this would seem unreasonable and despotic.
"The expulsion from such an order of a member * ' * is a very
serious matter and should not be had except for substantial cause" (p.
416, 103 N. Y. Supp. at 1010).
The by-law relied on to justify the expulsion read: "Any member who, by
verbal or written communication to railroad officials or others, interferes with
a grievance that is in the hands of a committee, or at any other time makes
any suggestion to any official that may cause discord in any division, shall be
expelled when proved guilty." This seems to be a standard by-law in railroad
engineers' unions. See Burke v. Monumental Division, supra note 9.

TRADE UNION ABUSES

as observed by him in the use of it. The Grand Chief Engineer was very much displeased with Rother's testimony
and directed the chief engineer of Rother's local to prefer
charges against him, that in testifying as he did, contrary
to the wishes of the Brotherhood, he violated the law of
the organization which provided that any member who wrote
or spoke to the injury or detriment or in interference of
"national legislative matters, offered by our legislative representative at Washington or Mexico" should be expelled.
While the charges were pending before the local, the Grand
Chief Engineer let it be known that he wanted Rother's expulsion from the union and in the event the local failed to
expel him, he would suspend its charter. iNevertheless, the
local found Rother not guilty. Thereupon the Grand Chief
22
Engineer ordered the suspension of the local
In another case, the Grand International Brotherhood
of Engineers expelled a member out of resentment of the
fact that when the strike of the railway brotherhoods was
being discussed just prior to the declaration of a state of
war between the United States and Germany "he (the member) declared his first allegiance to his country." 23
In New Orleans, some twenty-nine years ago, two members (Schneider and Schekler) of that city's local of the
United Association of Journeymen Plumbers, Gasfitters,
Steamfitters and Steamfitters' Helpers of the United States
and Canada, were on the New Orleans Board of Examiners
of Plumbers, a branch of the Municipal Government, composed of seven members. One of the board's functions was
to appoint one or more inspectors. While the matter of
appointing an inspector was pending before the Board of
Examiners, the union passed a resolution providing that
Schneider and Schekler be fined $25 "if they did not vote
-Abdon v. Wallace, supra note 10. The court characterized the Grand
Chief Engineer's conduct as "reprehensible in the extreme" and "out of keeping
with the principles of common honesty." "Who is this man Stone that he
should presume to instruct a witness as to what his testimony should be
before a governmental commission and to penalize him for testifying to the
truth * * * ?" (at p. 75).
' Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green, 210
Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923). The court held, "Under no law of the brotherhood
or of the land was th:s a just or sufficient ground for his expulsion" (at 499,
So. at 572).
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for brother William McGilvray as inspector of plumbing for
the City of New Orleans. Any other member outside of
McGilvray taking the position of plumbing inspector be fined
same as two members of plumbing board. Any member
taking position of plumbing inspector be expelled from
local." Schneider and Schekler nevertheless voted for
others than McGilvray for inspector. The union thereafter
enforced its resolution not only against Schneider and
Schekler but adopted resolutions fining also members working for employers who employed Schneider and Schekler
and thereby forced the employers of the latter to discharge
24
them.

In 1919, the president, first vice-president and secretary
of the Bricklayers, Plasterers & Stonemasons' Union of
America, acting as the executive board of the union, removed from office the president, who was also business
agent, of local 39, and then suspended him and five other
members from membership for a period of fifteen months,
organized a new local and transferred thereto all the property of the local and directed all the members of local 39
to become members of the new local. Those who refused,
over 105 persons, were likewise suspended by the executive
board. All this occurred because the president of local 39
was claimed to have committed a "contempt of the executive
board." All the suspensions were without charges and with25
out hearings.
' Schneider v. Local Union No. 60, 116 La. 270, 40 So. 700, 704 (1905). In
this case the court said that union regulations and action are binding on a
member "only in so far" as they are "lawful means" for the attainment of its
lawful purposes. "When the union attempts the accomplishment of an object
which is foreign to those purposes, or attempts the accomplishment of those purposes by unlawful means," the member may properly say: "'I entered into no
such contract'" * * * "the introduction of a resolution which is violative of the
fundamental law of the land has no better foundation and its passage no
greater effect" (p. 281).
"If, therefore, the appointment of McGilvray, rather than of some other
and perhaps more competent man, to the position of inspector, could be considered as furthering the purposes for which the defendant herein was established,
nevertheless the attempt to secure that appointment, by threatening and imposing
fines and suspension, in their capacity as members of the union upon public
officials charged with such appointment, was a violation of law; and this,
whether those officials, as members of the union, had committed themselves to
McGilvray's candidacy or not" (p. 282)
" Bricklayers P. & S. Union v. Bowen, 183 N. Y. Supp. 855 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe Co. 1920), aff'd, 198 App. Div. 967, 189 N. Y. Supp. 938 (4th Dept.
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Some seven years ago, several members of Local Union
585 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
of America filed, at a meeting of their union, charges of
misconduct against the president and other officers. The
president forbade the reading of the charges, threatened retaliation and immediately thereafter caused to be filed
against the members charges based on general provisions of
the by-laws and constitution prohibiting injury to the reputation of a fellow-member, conduct prejudicial to harmony,
or slander of an officer. The officers then caused the trial
of the charges against the members to be removed from the
local to the District Council, and that trial resulted in suspensions for a year and fines of $50.26
The foregoing cases 27 illustrate that the "brotherhood"
which unites members of a union is not so tolerant and benign as to obviate legal protection and regulation of a
member's right of membership. If the principle of mutual
aid governed at all times the inter-relations of members of
a union there would be no occasion for the interposition of
the law; but such an idealistic state is not to be expected
of man as evolved to date. Therefore, we must turn to a
consideration of the law governing the premises.
There seems to be no statutory regulation. After the
courts had ceased to regard unions as unlawful combina1921). The court held that summary removal or suspension without charges
or hearing was void, and as to the ground of the charge it commented (p. 860) :
"It may be said, in passing, that no such offense as implied contempt
of the executive officers or board is within the purview of the governing
laws of the union."
Jose v. Savage, 123 Misc. 283, 205 N. Y. Supp. 6 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co.
1924), Proskauer, J. "The procedure of these defendants was tyrannical and
sinister. Instead of meeting the charges against themselves, they tried to
destroy these plaintiffs for their temerity in making the charges. Equities most
persuasive in plaintiff's favor, therefore, prompt the court to find a legal ground
upon which to give redress" (at 284, 205 N. Y. Supp. at 7). And the court
did find legal ground.
-IThe current press reports similar occurrences. For example, the N. Y.
Times, Feb. 19, 1932, at 2, refers to the suspension and fining of fourteen
members of Local 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers in
retaliation for their commencement and prosecution of a court action for an
accounting, etc. See, concerning the same matter, N. Y. Times, March 17,
1932 at 2. See also N. Y. Times, March 24, 1932, at 15, reporting trial of an
injunction suit by suspended members against the International Union of Operating Engineers, and also the pendency of a suit for an accounting.
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tions
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they recognized a property right in membership

' Froelich v. Musicians Mutual Benefit Association, 93 Mo. App. 383
(1902) ; Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Association, supra note 4.
The history of the statutes in England against the freedom of labor and
the right of workingmen to combine is set forth by Chief Justice Parker in the
course of his opinion in National Protective Association v. Cumming, 170 N. Y.
315, 332-333, 63 N. E. 369, 373-374 (1902) :
"The Statutes (for there are two) of Labourers, passed in 1349 and
1350 (23 Edw. III, and 25 Edw. III, st. 1) provided: 'that every man
and woman of what condition he be, free or bond, able in body, and
within the age of three score years,' and not having means of his own,
'if he in convenient service (his estate considered) be required to serve,
he shall be bounden to serve him which so shall him require! And the
statutes provide that in case of refusal to serve, punishment by imprisonment might be inflicted, and that the laborer should take the customary
rate of wages and no more. These statutes not only regulated the wages
of laborers and mechanics, but they confined them to their existing places
of residence and required them to swear to obey the provisions of the
statutes. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, in his History of the Criminal
Law of England (Vol. III, p. 204), says, 'the main object of these
statutes was to check the rise in wages consequent upon the great pestilence called the black death.'
"Nearly 200 years later, and in 1548, a more general statute was
passed which forbade all conspiracies and covenants of artificers, workmen or laborers, 'not to make or do their work but at a certain price or
rate,' or for other similar purposes, under the penalty, on a third conviction, of the pillory and loss of an ear, and to 'be taken as a man
"infamous"' (2 & 3 Edw. VI, c. 15).
"Fourteen years later the prior statutes were to some extent amended
and consolidated into a longer act, entitled 'An Act containing divers
orders for artificers, laborers, servants of husbandry, and apprentices.'
It provided, in effect, that all persons able to work as laborers or
artificers and not possessed of independent means or other employments,
are bound to work as artificers or laborers on demand. The hours of
work are fixed; power is given to the justices in their next session after
Easter to fix the wages to be paid to mechanics and laborers; elaborate
rules are laid down as to apprenticeship, and it further provides that for
the future no one is to 'set up, occupy, use or exercise any craft, mystery
or occupation now used' until he has served an apprenticeship of seven
years (5 Eliz. c. 4). This statute remained in force practically for a
long period of time and was not formally repealed until the year 1875.
"In the year 1720 an act was passed declaring all agreements between
journeymen tailors 'for advancing their wages, or for lessening their
usual hours of work' to be null and void, and subjecting persons entering
into such an agreement to imprisonment with or without hard labor for
two months (7 Geo. I, st. 1, c. 13). Similar enactments were passed as
to employees in other manufactures and trades.
"The act of 1800 (40 Geo. III, c. 60) provided for a penalty of three
months imprisonment without hard labor or two months with hard labor
for every journeyman, workman or other person who 'enters into any
combination to obtain an advance of wages, or lessen or alter the hours
of work * * * or who hinders any employer from employing any person
as he thinks proper, or who being hired refuses without any just or
reasonable cause to work with any other journeyman or workman
employed or hired to work.' The same penalty is inflicted upon persons
who attend meetings held for the purpose of collecting money to further
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But, in that respect, no

such effort, and the act also makes it an offense to assist in maintaining
men who are on strike. This statute, as well as the others referred to,
have at last been swept away, but necessarily their influence has been
not inconsiderable in shaping the decisions of the courts of England."
In New York, while the right of workmen to organize into associations
seems to have been always recognized, until comparatively recently, activities
and contracts by such associations to the detriment of workmen who were not
members were held unlawful.
Thus, in Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33, 37, 46 N. E. 297, 298, 299 (1897),
a contract between an association of brewers with a union of brewery workingmen whereby the employers agreed to employ only members of the union was
condemned as unlawful.
But five years later, in National Protective Association v. Cumming, srupra,
the majority of the court practically, although not in terms, repudiated that
doctrine and held that a labor union had the right to coerce, by strike or threat
of strike, employers to discharge non-members and employ members in their
stead. Chief Justice Parker, with the concurrence of two of his associates, said
that it was lawful for unions to strive "to put their men in the place of certain
men at work who were non-members working for smaller pay" and they "set
about" to accomplish that purpose "in a perfectly lawful way." In that connection, they were "clearly within their rights" to determine "that if it were necessary they would bear the burden and expense of a strike to accomplish that
result," and it was equally lawful for them before striking "to inform the
contractors of their determination and the reason for it," that course being
"right and proper and reasonable." Judge Gray, in the same case, upheld the
legality of the union's activity in the following words:
"Briefly stated, my view is that the respondents had the legal right
to accomplish their object by all methods not condemned by the law.
That object was to secure the employment of the members of their own
association, in preference to, and to the exclusion of, those of the appellant association. They infringed upon no law in declaring to the employers of members of the appellant organization that they refused to work
with them; or that they would abandon their work unless the others were
discharged; or in preventing the members of the appellant association
from being employed as steam fitters * * *. Regarded * * * as a mere
struggle for exclusive preference of employment, on their own terms and
conditions, * * * how can it be said to be within the condemnation of the
law, or of any statute, when there was no force employed, nor any
unlawful act committed? Our laws recognize the absolute freedom of
the individual to work for whom he chooses, with whom he chooses and
to make any contract upon the subject that he chooses. There is the same
freedom to organize, in an association with others of his craft, to further
their common interests as workingmen, with respect to their wages, to
their hours of labor, or to matters affecting their health and safety. They
are free to secure the furtherance of their common interests in every
way, which is not within the prohibition of some statute, or which does
not involve the commission of illegal acts. The struggle on the part of
individuals to prefer themselves, and to prevent the work which they are
fitted to do from being given to others, may be keen and may have
unhappy results in individual cases; but the law is not concerned with
such results, when not caused by illegal means or acts" (at pp. 334-335,
63 N. E. at 374-375).
Judge Vann, with the concurrence of two of his associates, however, dissented,
most vigorously adhering to the doctrine announced in the Curran case and
arguing for its social and legal soundness.
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distinction was perceived between unions and other volunThree years later, the Court of Appeals, in Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y.
207, 76 N. E. 5 (1905), again with the vigorous dissent of Judge Vann, held
legal and enforceable a contract between an employer and a union whereby the
former agreed to employ only members of the latter. And in 1917, in Bossert
v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917), the Court of Appeals upheld
the right of a union to coerce the employers of its members to use or work on
only union-made material by striking or threatening to strike if the employers
permitted the use of non-union-made materials. The reasoning of the court
was as follows (at p. 355, 117 N. E. at 584) :
"It was not illegal, therefore, for the defendants to refuse to allow
members of the Brotherhood to work in the plaintiffs' mill with nonunion men. The same reasoning results in holding that the Brotherhood
may by voluntary act refuse to allow its members to work in the erection
of materials furnished by a non-union shop. Such action has relation to
work to be performed by its members and directly affects them. The
voluntary adoption of a rule not to work upon non-union-made material
and its enforcement differs only in degree from such voluntary rule and
its enforcement in a particular case."
The court added (at p. 359, 117 N. E. at 585)
"An association of individuals may determine that its members shall
not work for specified employers of labor. The question ever is as to its
purpose in reaching such determination. If the determination is reached
in good faith for the purpose of bettering the condition of its members
and not through malice or otherwise to injure an employer the fact that
such action may result in incidental injury to the employer does not
constitute a justification for issuing an injunction against enforcing
such action."
Also, at pp. 364-365, 117 N. E. at 587:
"When it is determined that a labor organization can control the
body of its members for the purpose of securing to them higher wages,
shorter hours of labor and better relations with their employers, and as
a part of such control may refuse to allow its members to work under
conditions unfavorable to it, or with workingmen not in accord with the
sentiments of the labor union, the right to refuse to allow them to install
non-union-made material follows as a matter of course, subject to there
being no malice, fraud, violence, coercion, intimidation or defamation in
carrying out their resolutions and orders.
"Voluntary orders by a labor organization for the benefit of its
members and the enforcement thereof within the organization is not
coercion."
The court was unanimous in expressing these views, and ten years later reiterated and summarized them in Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245
N. Y. 260, 263, 157 N. E. 130, 132-133 (1927) as follows:
"The purpose of a labor union to improve the conditions under which
its members do their work; to increase their wages; to assist them in
other ways may justify what would otherwise be a wrong. So would an
effort to increase its numbers and to unionize an entire trade or business.
It may be as interested in the wages of those not members, or in the
conditions under which they work as in its own members because of the
influence of one upon the other. All engaged in a trade are affected by
the prevailing rate of wages. All, by the principle of collective bargaining. Economic organization today is not based on the single shop. Unions
believe that wages may be increased, collective bargaining maintained
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tary associations, such as social clubs and fraternal lodges.2 9
Since to the latter was accorded unregulated right of selfdetermination and government, there was disposition not to
examine grounds of suspension or expulsion from unions.
On the other hand, the courts' Anglo-Saxon sense of "natural
justice" dictated that no member suffer except at the culmination of "due process." 30 So the courts were, and are,
rather strict as to procedure 30a and more or less laissez faire
on the substantive side.
The cases require that: proper notice of the charges be
given to the accused; 31 the charges adequately apprise the
only if union conditions prevail, not in some single factory but generally.
That they may prevail it may call a strike and picket the premises of an
employer with the intent of inducing him to employ only union labor.
And it may adopt either method separately. Picketing without a strike
is no more unlawful than a strike without picketing. Both are based
upon a lawful purpose. Resulting injury is incidental and must be
endured."
Compare, however, with Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38
Sup. Ct. 65 (1917).
See, for example, Maxwell v. Theatrical Mechanical Assn., 54 Misc. 619,
621, 104 N. Y. Supp. 815, 816-817 (1907), wherein the court said:
"In a purely voluntary association, the constitution and by-laws are
the contract between the parties; and, if their provisions are not illegal,
immoral or contrary to public policy, they must be upheld, whether
reasonable or not; for parties have the right to enter into unreasonable
and unwise contracts, so long as such contracts are not illegal and are
fairly made. Hess v. Johnson, 41 App. Div. 465, 58 N. Y. Supp. 983;
Kehlnenbeck v. Logenen, 10 Daly 447; Ulmer v. Minster, 37 N. Y.
Supp. 679, 16 Misc. Rep. 42; Cunniff v. Jamour, 31 Misc. Rep. 729, 65
N. Y. Supp. 317; Saerwein v. Jamour, 32 Misc. Rep. 701, 65 N. Y. Supp.
501; Leahy v. Mooney, 39 Misc. Rep. 829, 81 N. Y. Supp. 360; Shafer
v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 22 Misc. Rep. 363, 49 N. Y. Supp.
151; Jennings v. Chelsea Division, etc., 28 Misc. Rep. 556, 59 N. Y. Supp.
862; Rubino v. Fraternas Assn., 29 Misc. Rep. 339, 60 N. Y. Supp. 461.
The courts have invariably distinguished between the by-laws of corporations and those of voluntary associations."
Also Greenwood v. Building Trades Council, sutpra note 4.
' See Cabana v. Holstein-Friesian Association, 196 App. Div. 842, 848, 188
N. Y. Supp. 277, 282 (4th Dept. 1921), aff'd, 233 N. Y. 644, 135 N. E. 953
(1922).
"aAs will appear from the cases cited infra, it is not enough that the
proceedings be in accordance with the laws and regulations of the organization,
for the accused must be also "tried according to the law of the land." Wilcox
v. Royal Arcanum, 210 N. Y. 370, 376, 104 N. E. 624, 626 (1914). The procedural requirements are discussed with a goodly collection of cases in Note
(1930) 30 CoL. L. REv. 853, to which the author is indebted for a number of
the citations appearing infra. It is this writer's conclusion that generally the
procedural requirements are stricter than is indicated in that paper.
'See Note (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 853, cases cited in footnote 28 thereof
and Matter of Koch, 257 N. Y. 318, 178 N. E. 545 (1931), and cases cited at
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accused of the acts complained of; 32 a trial be had upon due
notice to the accused, 33 before a tribunal of unbiased persons, 34 constituted in accordance with the Constitution and
By-laws of the organization; 35 the accused be accorded adequate opportunity to defend; 36 only evidence presented
openly in the presence of the accused (except in the case of
his default) be considered; 3 and that the proceedings
be conducted in accordance with the organization's law, 38
which in turn must not contravene the requirements of
"natural justice." 3' It would seem also, that, in the abpp. 322-324 thereof, N. E. at 546. Also People ex rel. Deverell v. Musical
Mutual Protective Union, 118 N. Y. 101, 23 N. E. 129 (1889); Cabana v.
Holstein-Friesian Association, supra note 30; People ex rel. Meads v. McDonough, 8 App. Div. 591, 40 N. Y. Supp. 1147 (4th Dept. 1896); Gilmore v.
Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N. Y. Supp. 1 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Co. 1919); People
v. Order of Foresters, 162 Ill. 78, 44 N. E. 401 (1896).
'Ibid.
' Lewis

v. Wilson, 121 N. Y. 284, 288, 24 N. E. 474, 475 (1890) ; Roberts
v. Schifferdecker, 170 App. Div. 918, 154 N. Y. Supp. 1142 (2d Dept. 1915).
This includes notice of and right to be present at, every step in the proceeding,
such as the selection of the judges (Knights of Pythias v. Eskholme, 59 N. J.
L. 255, 35 AtI. 1055 (1896)).
' Matter of City of Rochester, 208 N. Y. 188, 101 N. E. 875 (1913);
Wilcox v. Royal Arcanum, supra note 30a at 378, 104 N. E. at 626; Cabana v.
Holstein-Friesian Association, supra note 30, and 112 Misc. 262, 182 N. Y.
Supp. 658 (1920) ; People ex rel. Pond v. Board of Trustees, 4 App. Div. 399,
39 N. Y. Supp. 607 (3rd Dept. 1896); People ex rel. Meads v. McDonough,
supra note 31; Williamson v. Randolph, 48 Misc. 96, 96 N. Y. Supp. 644
(1905).
' The trial must be "before a tribunal authorized to hear the same" (Reid
v. Medical Society, 156 N. Y. Supp. 780, 788 (1915), aff'd, 177 App.
Div. 939, 163 N. Y. Supp. 1129 (3rd Dept. 1917). "The decision made
should be within the scope of the jurisdiction conferred on the committee"
(Lewis v. Wilson, supra note 33, at 288, 24 N. E. at 475). See also Jose v.
Savage, supra note 26. The trial must be upon a charge "within the jurisdiction of the tribunal trying him." People v. Order of Foresters, supra note 31.
'Matter of Koch, supra note 31; Reid v. Medical Society, supra note 35;
Williamson v. Randolph, supra note 34. This includes the right to crossexamine adverse witnesses. Cabana v. Holstein-Friesian Association, 112 Misc.
262, 278-280, 182 N. Y. Supp. 658, 667-668, and cases therein cited (modified in
other respects, see salra note 30).
' Roberts v. Schifferdecker, supra note 33; Reid v. Medical Society, supra
note 35; Cabana v. Holstein-Friesian Association, supra note 36. The Reid
case, at pp. 788 and 789, announces this doctrine very emphatically.
People ex rel. Meads v. McDonough, supra note 31. The procedural
requirements of the organization must be strictly observed. Dingvall v. Amalgamated Ass'n, supra note 5.
" Olery v. Brown, 51 How. Pr. 92 (N. Y. 1875); Belton v. Hatch, 109
N. Y. 593, 17 N. E. 225 (1888); Lewis v. Wilson, supra note 33; Wilcox v.
Royal Arcanum, supra note 30a at 376, 104 N. E. at 626; Young v. Eames, 78
App. Div. 229, 241-2, 79 N. Y. Supp. 1068, 1075-6 (1st Dept. 1903), aff'd, 181
N. Y. 542, 73 N. E. 1134 (1905); Williamson v. Randolph, supra note 34;
Gilmore v. Palmer, supra note 31; Bricklayers, P. & S. Union v. Bowen,
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sence of any provision to the contrary, if the trial is before
a committee or board or designated officers,4 0 the trial must
be before all the judges.4 0a

If provision is made for a trial

before a quorum composed of less than all the judges, or if
the trial be before a meeting of the organization, there must
be reasonable notice to all the judges or members, as the
case may be, of the time and place of trial.41 Where the
trial is before a trial committee, but its decision is subject
to confirmation at a meeting of the organizatfon, or sentence
is imposed by the vote of such meeting, there is the same
supra note 25; Inderwick v. Snell, 2 Mac. & G. 216 (1850); Hopkinson v.
Marquis of Exeter, L. R. 5 Eq. Cas. 63 (1867). In the Bricklayers case (183
N. Y. Supp. 855, 859), the court said:
"Such associations are not, however, above the law of the land, nor
altogether a law unto themselves. Their very nature and frequent manner of operation require and find a jealous supervision, in order to prevent
irreparable wrong being done to members under the guise of family
chastisement. It is not the policy of the law that our people shall be
left to suffer without redress from the whims or at the caprice of those
to whom they have in good faith temporarily intrusted themselves and
their affairs. Therefore, the law is vigilant to * * * insure to every
member * * * fair play, which in the final analysis is the spirit of the
law of the land."
o Unless the constitution or by-laws provide for or authorize a trial by
designees, the weight of authority seems to be to the effect that the power of
trial resides exclusively in the entire membership in meeting assembled and is
not delegatable. People ex rel. Meads v. McDonough, supra note 31 (citing
cases pro and con).
'a I know of no case directly in point, but it seems to me that the common
law princ'ple that whenever a power is conferred upon more than one, there
must be unanimity of action for a lawful exercise of the power, applies here.
That common-law principle is exemplified, for instance, in the requirement of
a unanimous vote by a jury, and in requiring unanimous co-action of all executors and trustees in all matters involving the exercise of discretion. Directly
in point is an analogy to be drawn from arbitration proceedings, where the rule
is that, in the absence of provision to the contrary in statute or agreement, all
the arbitrators must hear the controversy and agree upon a determination
thereof (Green v. Miller, 6 Johns. 39 (N. Y. 1810) ; Cope v. Gilbert, 4 Denih
347 (N. Y. 1847).
People ex rel. Meads v. McDonough, supra note 31; Matter of Koch, 232
App. Div. 483, 485-6, 250 N. Y. Supp. 386, 388-9 (1st Dept. 1931) (the reversal
of which by the Court of Appeals was on the ground of waiver-supra note
31). For analogy in arbitration proceedings, see Bulson v. Lohnes, 29 N. Y.
291 (1864); Matter of Bullard v. Grace Co., 240 N. Y. 388, 148 N. E. 559
(1925) ; Matter of A. E. Fire Ins. Co. v. New Jersey Insurance Company, 240
N. Y. 398, 407, 148 N. E. 562, 565 (1925), the rule in arbitration proceedings
being that where less than the full number may make a valid determination, the
number required to make a valid determination constitutes a quorum in the
absence of statute or contract to the contrary, but in that event less than the
entire number of the arbitrators may proceed only where the absent arbitrators
had proper notice and either refused to attend and participate in the proceedings
or were wilfully absent.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard to the
accused 41a and of notice to all those entitled to vote on the
matter, 42 and this applies also to a reconsideration.4 2 a
Any one or more of these requirements may be waived
by the accused.4 3 The charges must allege acts which
constitute a violation of some provision of the organization's
law 44 or of the member's obligation of loyalty, 45 and the
penalty imposed must be one provided for by the organiza"a

People ex rel. Holstrom v. Independent Dock Builders' Benevolent

Union, supra note 7; Fowler v. Larabee, mipra note 33.
"People ex rel. Mead v. McDonough, supra note 31, is directly in point.
While the opinion of the Appellate Division, Third Department, in Havens v.
King, supra note 7 (where the trial committee was required by the constitution
to report to the next regular meeting, and no notice of regular meetings was
required, and the court sustained a vote of expulsion adopted at such regular
meeting in- the absence of notice to the members that the matter would be
considered at the meeting), is susceptible of an inference that notice is unnecessary in the circumstances there presented,. that inference, -if intended by the
court, is erroneous as appears from the opinion of the Appellate Division, First
Department, in the later case of Matter of Koch, supra note 41, where the
requirement of notice laid down in People ex rel. Mead v. McDonough was
expressly followed, and the Court of Appeals impliedly sustained that holding
but held that the plaintiffs had waived the defects. The true ground of decision
in the Havens case is the same as that of the Court of Appeals in the Koch
case, namely, waiver.
4a McCantz v. Brotherhood of Painters, 13 S. W. (2d) 902 (Tex. 1929).
Fines imposed upon a reconsideration had without notice to the accused were
held void.
' See Matter of Haebler, supra note 5 at 426, 44 N. E. at 91; Matter of
Koch, supra note 31 (and cases cited therein) ; Havens v. King, supra note 7;
People ex rel. Baker v. Coachmen's Union, 4 Misc. 424, 24 N. Y. Supp. 114
(Gen. T., 1893); National League of Commission Merchants v. Hornung, 148
App. Div. 355, 359, 132 N. Y. Supp. 871, 874 (4th Dept. 1911) ; People ex rel,
Schults v. Love, 199 App. Div. 815, 818, 192 N. Y. Supp. 354, 356 (1st Dept.
1922); Williamson v. Randolph, supra note 34; Raych v. Hadida, 72 Misc.
469, 471, 130 N. Y. Supp. 346, 348 (Sup. Ct. Erie Co. 1911).
"Burke v. Monumental Division, supra note 9; lit re Haebler v. N. Y.
Produce Exchange, supra note 5; Miller v. Builders' League, 29 App. Div. 630,
53 N. Y. Supp. 1016 (1st Dept. 1898); Austin v. Dutcher, 56 App. Div. 393,
67 N. Y. Supp. 819 (1st Dept. 1900); Strauss v. Thoman, 60 Misc. 72, 111
N. Y. Supp. 745, aff'd, 129 App. Div. 905, 113 N. Y. Supp. 1148 (1st Dept.
1908); Ranken v. Probey, 131 App. Div. 328, 115 N. Y. Supp. 832 (3rd Dept.
1909); Fritz v. Knaub, supra note 21; Bricklayers, P. & S. Union v. Bowen,
supra note 25; Connell v. Stalker, 21 Misc. 609, 48 N. Y. Supp. 77
1897); Grassi Bros. v. O'Rourke, 89 Misc. 234, 153 N. Y. Supp. 493
(1915); Robinson v. Dahm, 94 Misc. 729, 159 N. Y. Supp. 1053 (1916);
Dingwall v. Amalgamated Ass'n, supra note 5; People v. Order of Foresters,
supra note 31; Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, supra note 11; Luby v. Warwichshire Miners' Association (1912) 2 Ch. 371; Burns v. National Amalgamated Labourers' Union (1920) 2 Ch. 364; Amalgamated Society of Carpenters
v. Braithwaite and General Union v. Ashley, 2 A. C. 440 (1922) ; Blackall v.
National Union of Foundry Workers, 39 T. L. R. 431 (1923).
' Supra note 6.
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tion's laws, 46 or expulsion in the case of gross breach of the
47
obligation of loyalty.
As to the right of trial before an unbiased (in the legal
sense) tribunal, it was held in Wilcox v. Royal Arcanum,48
that where the accused was charged with libel and the
tribunal selected to try him was composed of the persons
alleged to have been libelled, the proceedings were a nullity.
But in that case there were others who were eligible to serve
as judges. Not infrequently, the fundamental law of an
organization constitutes a named board or designated officials as the sole tribunal for the trial of charges. Would
the bias of so many of them as to leave less than a quorum
of competent judges disqualify in such a case. If so, who
could lawfully try the charges? At least one case holds that
the action of the designated tribunal or officials is valid and
4
binding. sa
Where the proceedings are free of fatal procedural defect, it is sometimes stated to be the rule of law that the
courts do not review the organization's determination,4 9 and
usually and more accurately it is said that in those circumstances the courts, ordinarily, do not substitute their
judgment for that of the association or its proper tribunal."
However, aside from reviewing the procedural regularity of
the proceedings according to the rules above outlined, and
in addition, reviewing the substantive sufficiency of the
charges to the extent shown above and infra, the courts, also, set aside convictions where there is an absence of proper
51 and probably,
evidence to support it,
would do the same
'People ex rel. Doyle v. Benevolent Society, 3 Hun 361 (N. Y. 1875).
See also Polin v. Kaplan, suptra note 5; Dingwall v. Amalgamated Ass'n, supra
note 5.
"Supra note 6.
"For other cases, see supra note 34.
'a Hall v. Morrin, 293 S. W. 435 (Mo. 1927).

" For example, the opinion (unreported) of the trial justice in Polin v.
Kaplan, supra note 5, was as follows:
"The proceedings were in accordance with the laws of the association, and the courts will not examine into the merits of the expulsion."
People ex rel. Johnson v. N. Y. Produce Exchange, 149 N. Y. 401,

44 N. E. 84 (1896); Havens v. King, supra note 7 (see quotation, infra
note 52).
. Fritz v. Knaub, supra note 21; Reid v. Medical Society, supra note 35,

at p. 789. See also It re Haebler v. N. Y. Produce Exchange, supra note 5
at 428, 44 N. E. at 91.
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in a case where the weight of the evidence is very clearly
contrary to the vote of guilt; particularly, if it should appear that the charges were merely a means of effecting an
expulsion really desired for other reasons. 2
There is, however, no requirement that a stenographic
record be taken and kept of the proceedings, and in the absence of that, there might arise a dispute as to what was
presented to and heard by the organization's tribunal, and
it might be difficult to review the sufficiency or propriety
of the proof that had been adduced.
While, on the whole, the procedural safeguards imposed
by the courts are adequate, the administration of justice
in these matters would be furthered by several changes.
Accurate stenographic records should be required, and in
the absence thereof, a member who feels aggrieved by a decision against him should be entitled to a court trial de novo.
Such a trial should also be accorded to one convicted by a
biased board, even if the board be the sole constitutional
tribunal. And even where the entire membership acts as
the trials tribunal, since in those cases it is rather rare that
there should not be considerable heat and rancor, if the
court upon examination of the record be in doubt as to the
justice of the conviction, a trial de novo should be held.
With respect to the substance of charges, the law is
in a very unsatisfactory state. Although the law does not accord organizations conclusive power and final arbitrament
in the premises, the scope of the veto power exercised by
the courts is narrow and uncertain and the courts in some
respects have even enlarged the power of the organization
beyond its own law, despite general statements to the contrary in a number of cases.
It has already been pointed out that disciplinary action
taken by a union will be set aside where the matters
charged against the member do not constitute a punishable
offense under the law of the union or a "gross breach" of
52
loyalty. a
"' Grand International B. of L. Engineers v. Green, supra note 23 at 499,
98 So. at 572. See also Jose v. Savage, mspra note 26. But see Havens v. King,
supra note 7 at 479-480, 224 N. Y. Supp. at 197-199.
'a Supra notes 44 and 45.
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But even where an express existing law of the organization is violated, the member is not necessarily foreclosed
from relief by the courts. While it is declared that a constitution and by-laws, just "as they prescribe the precise
terms upon which membership may be gained," so may they
also "conclusively define the conditions which may entail
its loss," 53 this broad rule is subject to two qualifications:
(1) that the condition sought to be imposed and enforced
be not unreasonable, 4 and (2) that such condition violate
"
no law of the sovereign and contravene no public policy.
On the other hand, in addition to the power to discipline in accordance with its express laws, the organization
' Polin v. Kaplan, supra note 5 at 281-2, 177 N. E. at 834.
' People ex rel. Gray v. Medical Society, 24 Barb. 570, 575 (N. Y. 1857);
People ex rel. Doyle v. N. Y. Benevolent Society, mtpra note 46; Brown v.
Supreme Court I. 0. F., 34 Misc. 556, 70 N. Y. Supp. 397, aft'd, 66 App. Div.
259, 72 N. Y. Supp. 806 (4th Dept. 1901), aff'd, 176 N. Y. 132, 68 N. E. 145
(1903); McCord v. Thompson-Starrett Co., 198 N. Y. 587, 92 N. E. 1090
(1910); Wilcox v. Royal Arcanum, supra note 8; People ex rel. Meads v.
McDonough, supra note 31 at 599-560, 35 N. Y. Supp. at 219-220; Robinson v.
Dahm, supra note 44. In the Brown case supra, the court at Special Term
said: "The law is well established that the rules and regulations of organizations of this character must be reasonable to be binding * * * " (at 560, 70
N. Y. Supp. at 400) ; and the Appellate Division, after stating, "By the express
terms of his agreement the relator has agreed to conform to the constitution
and by-laws of the order," continued: "While due force will be given to the
contract made by any member of one of these mutual benefit societies, it
cannot be expected that the state courts will abdicate their jurisdiction and be
supplanted by courts provided for by the constitution and laws of the association. And wherever an unreasonable or unjust restriction or burden is put upon
a member of a fraternal society, the courts will interfere to protect the rights
of such member" (at 262, 72 N. Y. Supp. at 808-9). And the Court of Appeals
in that case said: "Conceding that the constitution and by-laws of the defendant
are a part of the contract between the parties and the general rule that the law
permits great freedom of action in making contracts, there are some restricttions placed upon that right by legislation, by public policy and by the nature
of things. * * * The learned courts below have held that the by-laws had no
effect upon the status of the relator as a member of the order in good standing
for the reason that in so far as they deprived him of the rights acquired by
his membership they were unreasonable and void. We fully concur with this
view of the case and in the reasons stated in support of it in the learned
opinion below" (at 137-138, 68 N. E. at 146).
That requirement of reasonableness is also recognized in Polin v. Kaplan,
supra note 5, where immediately following the statement that the constitution
and by-laws of an association may "conclusively define the conditions which
will entail" the loss of membership, the court states: "Thus, if the contract
reasonably provides that the performance of certain acts will constitute a
sufficient cause for the expulsion * * *" (at 282, 177 N. E. at 834). The
apparently contra statement in Maxwell v. Theatrical Mechanical Ass'n, supra
note 29, seems to be overruled.
Brown v. Supreme Court I. 0. F., supra note 54; and supra notes 10,
11, 22, 23, 24.
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has the implied power to expel a member for a gross breach
of his obligation of "loyal support of the society in the attainment of its proper purposes"; 56 and the fact that the
constitution and by-laws may contain a varied and detailed
penal code, so to speak, does not in any way limit the implied power.5 7 Apparently, the principle of inctusio unius est
exclusio atterius does not apply. Furthermore, reasonableness and public policy are not very satisfactory limitations,
in the absence of a wide range of adjudications on the
subject.
What provisions the courts will regard as unreasonable
is entirely a matter of speculation. In the cases which have
arisen, with very few exceptions, 57 a the courts shied at de-

claring unreasonable the substantive provisions that were
invoked; where their consciences were shocked by the ground
of the penalization, they resorted to a strict construction of
the organization's fundamental law and concluded that the
acts charged did not come within it. 58 It is probably correct to surmise that harshness or arbitrariness will not be
sufficient to outlaw a provision if it deal with a matter directly within the scope of the union's activity. Thus, for
example, a union by-law prohibiting members from adPolin v. Kaplan, supra note 5 at 283, 177 N. E. at 834.
" The constitution and by-laws of the union involved in Polin v. Kaplan,
supra note 5, set forth at least ten specific offenses and provided penalties
therefor ranging from a fine of fifty cents to expulsion. But see Burns v.
National Amalgamated Labourers' Union, supra note 44, at 373-374, wherein
the court said that the power to discipline "being in its nature penal, has to be
exercised strictly in accordance with the language of the rule" and that there
"ought not be implied" any power beyond that; and also Dingwall v. Amalgamated Ass'n, supra note 5 at 570, 88 Pac. at 601: "By enumerating certain
offenses for which the penalty of expulsion may be imposed, the right to inflict
such penalty for any other offense is impliedly excluded."
,a People ex rel. Gray v. Medical Society, supra note 54. In People ex rel.
Meads v. McDonough, supra note 31, the court was liberal with dicta as to what
may and what may not be made lawful ground of expulsion, but the expulsion
in that case was set aside on a procedural ground, because a brother of the
accused's prosecutor was a member of the trial committee, and compare (see
note 73) the dicta with Polin v. Kaplan, supra note 5. In the Brown case,
spra note 54, a by-law which constituted the organization's financial secretaries
the member's agents so that where a financial secretary failed to properly record
and account for dues paid to him by a member, the latter was in default in the
payment of dues was held to be void for unreasonableness; but it was also said
to be void because it attempted to overrule the law of agency and to alter legal
relationships by fiat or misnomers, and was, therefore, contrary to law.
' Burke v. Monumental Division, supra note 9; Fritz v. Knaub, supra note
21; Connell v. Stalker, supra note 44; Amalgamated Society of Carpenters v.
Braithwaite, supra note 44.
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versely criticising an officer or a decision of the union, except in executive session of the union itself, regardless of
the truth, merit and good intentions of the criticism, and
prov'iding that any member violating the rule should be expelled, probably would not be held unreasonable even
though the criticism in a particular case be just and proceed from a motive to improve the affairs of the union and
its members and be the outburst of true devotion thereto.
While it has been said that by openly making a well
founded accusation that officers of an organization are
"grafters" a member might be discharging his "highest duty"
to the organization and that "the temporary injury resulting
from the expos6 of wrongdoing was more than offset by the
permanent good," " nevertheless, if the law of an organization should expressly legislate against the subordination of
the temporary injury to the permanent good, it is extremely
unlikely that the courts would take it upon themselves to
outlaw such intraorganization regulation. Moreover, if a
particular prohibition be not unreasonable, query, whether
the courts would vacate an expressly authorized penalty if
such penalty be deemed unnecessarily and despotically harsh
and extreme.
The reservation or qualification of reasonableness in the
statement that a member is bound by the provisions of his
association's constitution and by-laws probably does not reflect a perception by the judges of any definite limitations
but rather results from the habitual circumspection of well
chosen judicial language, which, in the enunciation of general rules, employs "safety valves" of that character, sometimes without realization of what is being saved. If anything
definite was envisaged, it was probably nothing more than
that members are not bound by regulations beyond the scope
of the association's proper purposes, 60 such as attempts to
N. E. at 627.
' Of necessity, the purposes for which persons associate together define the
powers delegated to the entity over the individuals. Any laws it may adopt,
whether in the form of constitution, by-laws, regulations or resolutions, must
be in furtherance of, and have some reasonable connection with, the ends of the
association. See Schneider v. Local Union No. 60, msura note 24. Naturally,
the delineation is not sharp, and while whether some acts are within or without
the scope of the organization may be subject to debate, others are so clearly in
one category or the other as to be beyond debate.
"' Wilcox v. Royal Arcanum, supra note 8 at 379, 104
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regulate the conduct of members in matters or respects unrelated to the proper scope of the organization."1 Such a
by-law would be held void for unreasonableness. Perhaps,
it would be better logic to say that it is void as ultra vires.
Similarly, an attempt to punish or eliminate a member for
an act unrelated to the welfare of the association, under a
blanket provision authorizing discipline for acts deemed injurious, detrimental or prejudicial, would be held an unreasonable application of the by-law; but then, too, ordinary
judicial construction of the by-law or the doctrine of ultra
vires would serve to nullify the organization's determination.
Except in the two respects just mentioned, the qualification of reasonableness, in all likelihood, will find little empirical application, unless the courts, recognizing the needs
of the times and the grave consequences of injustice to individual members by associations that control their members'
economic existence, should become more critical than they
have been of the disciplinary action of such aggregates and
more solicitous of the individual member's welfare. 62 Such
For example, in Tyborowski v. Kaplan, supra note 7, where the ground
of discipline was alleged assault by the accused on another member and allegedly
false testimony concerning the same, Mr. Justice Cropsey (Sup. Ct. Kings Co.)
in granting a motion for an injunction pendente lite,
held, in an unreported
opinion, that the alleged acts could not be "the basis of suspension or expulsion"
and that that was "manifest"; and in Commonwealth v. St. Patrick Benevolent
Society, 2 Binn. 441 (Pa. 1810) the court held void a by-law permitting
expulsion for vilifying any of the members, that not being an offiense
which affects the interests or good government of the organization, private
quarrels being totally unconnected with the affairs of the society.
" There is certainly a growing tendency in that direction. In Bricklayers',
P. & S. Union v. Bowen, mprra note 25 (183 N. Y. Supp. at 861), the
court said:
"Labor organizations have become an integral part of our business
life and wield a powerful influence upon the everyday affairs of multitudes of our people. * * * [who] must rely on their honest, fair and
efficient management for opportunity to support themselves and their
families. These members constitute a goodly percentage of our citizenship, and the state is vitally interested in their welfare."
Similarly, in Jose v. Savage, supra note 26, at 284, 205 N. Y. Supp. at 7, the
court said:
"The great importance of labor unions in contemporary economic life
requires that, for the sake of the public, of their own members, and of
the institution itself, their affairs should be conducted with decent regard
for the rights of their members."
And compare the decisions of the Court of Appeals in Polin v. Kaplan, supra
note 5, with Matter of Koch, supra note 31, in the latter of which the court
distinguishes the rules governing amotion from those governing disenfranchisement and is rather liberal in sustaining amotion.
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a change of attitude requires the abandonment, with respect
to such associations, of the maxim of the courts-already
rendered practically meaningless by exceptions-that they
will not, ordinarily, interfere in the internal affairs of associations.
The limitations of lawfulness and public policy are more
potent. In the absence of applicable statutory limitations,
"public policy" as conceived by the courts has served to curb
certain categories of intraunion despotism. Thus far, public
policy has been held to outlaw penalization of a member for
resorting to the courts of the land, 3 for petitioning the legislature,6 4 for disregarding union instructions in the course of
testimony as a witness under subpoena, 65 for disregard of
union instructions in the course of a member's discharge of
his duty as a municipal official,6" for a declaration that his
devotion to his country takes precedence over his loyalty to
his union. 67
The rule to be deduced from these decisions is that the
law will not permit private bodies to control with sanctions
a member in the exercise of his civic rights or prerogatives
or in the discharge of his civic duties. Just as it is deemed
68
in furtherance of the public weal to privilege a legislator,
judge,6 9 a litigant and his attorney,7 0 etc., in the discharge
of his official duties and in the official exercise of the prerogatives of his office, so, too, is a citizen immune from private
sanctions, for his acts and words as a member of the sov'

Polin v. Kaplan, supra note 5. The Court of Appeals in that case held

that the commencement and prosecution of actions against the union, as a
matter of law, "displayed no disloyalty to the union and performed no act

injurious to the society or tending to its disruption," and added: "It was the
absolute right of the plaintiffs to bring the suit whether they could successfully
284
s
maintain it or not and they might not be expelled for having so done" (at
177 N. E. at 835). The Appellate Division (2d Dept.) in the same case held
that "an appeal to the courts, in and of itself," could not be made "such a violation of the by-laws as to justify expulsion" (231 App. Div. 849, 850, 246 N. Y.
Supp. 524).
,Supra note 11.
' Supra note 10.
' Supra note 24.
o'Supra note 23.
' See U. S. CoNsT., Art. I, See. 5; N. Y. STATE CONsT., Art. III, Sec. 12.
' Aylesworth v. St. John, 25 Hun 156 (N. Y. 1881); Valesh v. Prince,
94 Misc. 479, 159 N. Y. Supp. 598 (1916), aff'd, 177 App. Div. 891, 163 N. Y.
Supp. 1133 (1st Dept. 1917).
oLesser v. International Trust Co., 175 App. Div. 12, 161 N. Y. Supp. 624
(1st Dept. 1916) ; see Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 135 N. E. 515 (1922).
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ereign body politic and for his resort to its governmental
powers. Even if a member abuse his privilege and do so out
of malice, those injured thereby are limited to legal redress,
if any they have; they may not take it upon themselves either
to judge or punish him for his relations with the sovereign.
The efficacy and supremacy of government could not otherwise be maintained.
While, as we have seen, the courts have curbed the disciplinary laws of organizations by rules against unreasonableness and of public policy, they, on the other hand, have
enlarged the discipl.inary power by affording associations
the right to expel not only in the instances provided by its
laws but for a "gross breach" of a member's obligation of
loyalty. 71 The vagueness and elasticity of the latter rule are
sufficient to condemn it. Unlike the similarly damnable
blanket by-laws that some associations have, .it
cannot be
said in support of this court-made rule that members are
bound thereby because of their adoption thereof. It has always been recognized that penal statutes should be definite.
The considerations which require that recognition of definiteness by the state apply even more to associations that
control the member's l ivelihood-there, the excesses of the
powers in control are not subject to check by disinterested
juries. Moreover, the meaning and applicability of such rules
are learned, in each case, only ex post facto. Therefore,
sound public policy requires the elimination of all such elastic rules. The fundamental law of every union should set
forth specifically what acts are prohibited and the consequence of transgression. That should be both the grant (to
the extent it is valid) and limit of its disciplinary power.
The organization law should be drawn with care so as to
fully protect the organization. If, perchance, some harmful
offence be overlooked, experience will result in amendment.
While such amendment will not affect offences already consummated, it is far better that such offences go unrequited
than that as a result of elastic provisions members find themselves fined, suspended or expelled for acts which they deem
perfectly proper or outside the association's interest.
'Supra note 6.
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The improvidence of the "implied power" rule appears
from its ramifications. A recent New York 72 case states
that the court is not prepared to hold that the libelling of an
officer is not just and sufficient ground for expulsion where
the libel is unfounded and tends to the disruption of the
Since the organization itself is the judge
organization."
(on evidence) of the truth or falsity of the defamatory statements and of whether or not they tend to the disruption of
the organization, where the officer is in effective control attacks upon him, however merited, may result in the expulsion of the attacker whenever willed by the defamed officer.
This tends to make union leaders immune from criticism
by their members. The policy of the state towards its own
officers is quite the reverse; it is deemed in the public interest to permit criticism of those who onduct the state's
affairs,74 or run for office 7 5 subject only to the ordinary laws
of slander and libel and even these are applied more liberally
in favor of the critic.7 6 The power of an organization to
expel for defamation is analogous to the unique power of the
judiciary to punish for contempt of court, except that it is
12Polin

v. Kaplan, supra note 5.
In so holding, the Court of Appeals pointed out that in People ex rel.
Meads v. McDonough, supra note 31, the court had drawn a distinction between
slander of the organization and slander of an officer thereof, holding the former
an act of disloyalty and the latter not such an act, but called attention to the
statement in Wilcox v. Royal Arcanum, supra note 8, at 284-285, 104 N. E.
at 627, that "undoubtedly it would injure the order temporarily, at least, to
accuse its officers of being 'grafters,'" and concluded that it was "not prepared"
to say that a member's slander of an officer, when "unfounded or * * * made
maliciously without probable cause" and which tends "to the disruption" of the
organization does not justify his expulsion. The reasoning of the court in the
Meads case, supra note 31, was that libeled or slandered members "can seek
redress in the civil tribunals, and do not need the extreme remedy of excluding
the offender * * *"(at 600, 35 N. Y. Supp. at 220).
See Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N. Y. 27,.96 N. E. 84 (1911).
Cortright v. Anderson, 208 App. Div. 1, 202 N. Y. Supp. 729 (4th
Dept. 1924).
" Supra notes 74 and 75, and see Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co., 254
N. Y. 95, 172 N. E. 139 (1930). It is interesting to note that in Hall v.
Morrin, supra note 48a (293 S. W. 435-Mo. 1927), where the member was
charged with having defamed the officers of the union in a petition presented in
a court proceeding, it was held that "the fact that the statements, charged to
have been wrongfully and unjustly made, appeared in plaintiff's petition filed in
court, rendered them none the less subject" to disciplinary action, even though
the matter was privileged from suit for libel, the court saying that a member
is in no position to complain of the unreasonableness of a provision in the
contract of membership which contravenes "what might otherwise have been
regarded as his common rights." This case cannot be reconciled on principle
with those cited in supra notes 54, 63-67.
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more extensive and it is not subject to, and therefore not
curbed by, the adverse publicity that a grave abuse of the
power by a judge is bound to bring. The power vested in the
associations is even more extensive than the contempt power
of the judiciary, for the latter is limited to the punishment
of contumacity directly related to official acts. The defamation of a judge with respect to matters not related to his
office-for example, calling him a scoundrel, thief or swindler in his private life or business dealings-does not authorize the exercise of the judge's or his court's disciplinary
power. Whereas, the theory of the rule authorizing associations to expel members who defame their officers permits
no distinction between accusation of misfeasance in office
and denunciation for other cupidity. Suppose that a member
of a union say of an officer that no fault can be found with
his conduct in relation to the union and its members but
that he is a gangster or kidnapper or murderer; if the statement be widely published and credited, certainly that would
react unfavorably on the union; and under the rule here discussed expulsion of the member would be in order if the
union determine that the defamatory statements were false.
To be sure the harm to the repute and effectiveness of the
organization resulting from an accusation of that character
might be greater than from a charge that the officer appropriated to himself $25,000 of the union's funds, and if there
is to be a power to expel for defamation, it is reasofiable that
it should be exercisable in one case as in the other, on the
principle that its exercise should depend upon the injury
done to the organization rather than on technical distinctions between attacks on an officer ex officio, or merely as an
individual. It is, however, well to appreciate the scope of
the power in the consideration of its propriety. At first
blush, *it might appear proper that an organization should
have the power to expel a member who, by defamation of
one kind or another, brings disrepute upon it. But it must
be realized that the power inevitably leads to suppression
and oppression; it serves to conceal wrongdoing and to promote tyranny; it subjects to woeful hardship those brave
souls who rise to tell the truth, or what they believe to be
the truth, regardless of the hazard encountered. Free speech,

TRADE UNION ABUSES

after all, has great therapeutic power which far outweighs
occasional temporary victimization, and is a right that is
priceless to men of self-respect. A power to punish for words
is so suspective of evil that it should be exercisable only with
the greatest safeguards and may not be entrusted to private
persons or bodies, particularly, where the personal interest
of the one aggrieved by the words might influence the disciplinary proceeding. The fact that harm is done to the organization is not sufficient to call for the exercise of the power.
Suppose precisely the same accusation is made by one who
is not a member and it receives equal or greater publicity
and credence, what then? Or suppose, the accusation is
made by a member as a relevant and material statement in
the course of litigation or is made the basis of litigation?
It will be without recourse then. Why must it have recourse
where it is a member who makes the statement and he makes
it on the floor of the union rather than in court? The consequences that come from such occurrences are unavoidable
incidents of social life, and must be suffered as such without private vengeance. There is no right of private redress.
We have a judicial system and penal codes to supplant private chastisement. Therefore, the disciplinary power of
unions should be exercised most sparingly. It seems to the
writer to be in the public interest that the disciplinary
power of unions be confined to specified offences set forth
in the union's fundamental law, and that defamation or contempt of the union or its officers be not such an offence.
There is one other element in the exercise of the disciplinary power which calls for consideration. The fundamental laws of unions, as of other organizations, not infrequently provide for a system of appeals from decisions in
disciplinary proceedings. Usually, unions are locals or
branches of a nation-wide organization, and, commonly, the
order of appeal includes provision for appeal to the parent
body or tribunals thereof. Not infrequently, provisions of
the latter kind are illusory more than real because the constitutions and by-laws of the parent bodies extend to the
locals complete self-determination and "home rule," and
thereby bar the review of a local's discipline of a member.
The general rule of a number of the courts is that they
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will not review or interfere with the fine, suspension or expulsion of a member until he has exhausted his remedies
within the organization. 77 But the courts have been alive
to the injustice of an indiscriminate application of the rule.
Thus, it is held, that where the action against the member
is dependent upon the construction or application of a law
of the organization," or where the objection to the action
rests upon the absence of a law justifying the action or the
illegality of the law upon which the action was predicated, 7 9
and, generally, where the proceeding presents solely questions of law, 0 exhaustion of the rights of appeal within the
organization is unnecessary. Stated differently, the rule is
that where the action against the member is void either under
'Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal. 613, 50 Pac. 763 (1897) ; Mead v. Stirling,
62 Conn. 586, 27 Atl. 591 (1892) ; Edrington v. Hall, 168 Ga. 484, 148 S. E.
403 (1929); People v. Order of Foresters, supra note 31; Jeane v. Grand
Lodge, 86 Me. 434, 30 At. 70 (1894) ; Oliver v. Hopkins, 144 Mass. 175, 10
N. E. 776 (1887) ; Harris v. Detroit Typographical Union, 144 Mich. 422, 108
N. W. 362 (1906) ; Crutcher v. Eastern Division Order of Railway Contractors, 151 Mo. App. 622, 132 S. W. 307 (1910); Hall v. Morrin, supra note
48a; Wilber v. Lincoln Aerie, 99 Neb. 428, 156 N. W. 658 (1916); Crisler v.
Crum, 115 Neb. 375, 213 N. W. 366 (1927); Zeliff v. Knights of Pythias,
53 N. J. L. 536, 22 Atl. 63 (1891) ; McCantz v. Brotherhood of Painters, supra
note 42a; Essery v. Court Pride of the Dominion, 2 Ont. 596 (1883) ; Kelly v.
National Society of Printers' Assistants, 84 L. J. K. B. (N. s.) 2236 (1915) ;
Havens v. King, stepra note 7; Johansen v. Blume, 53 App. Div. 526, 65 N. Y.
Supp. 987 (4th Dept. 1900); Local Union 1006 v. Brotherhood of Painters,
149 N. Y. Supp. 1025 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1914); O'Connor v. Morrin, 109
Misc. 379, 179 N. Y. Supp. 599 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1919). Apparently the
New York Court of Appeals has never committed itself to this general rule; it
refused to apply it in the Brown case, supra note 54, and ignored it in Polin
v. Kaplan, spra note 5 (see infra note 79).
People ex rel. Weiss v. Bernstein Sick & Benefit Soc., 161 App. Div. 823,
146 N. Y. Supp. 886 (1st Dept. 1914).
"Schou v. Sotoyme Tribe, 140 Cal. 254, 73 Pac. 996 (1903); Abdon v.
Wallace, supra note 10 ("such suspension being void * * * appellant * * *

[was] not thereafter required to seek relief within the brotherhood, but [was]
entitled at once to resort directly to the courts") (p. 75) ; Pirics v. First
Russian Society, 83 N. J. Eq. 29, 89 Atl. 1036 (1914) ; Brown v. Supreme
Court I. 0. F., vtpra note 54; Polin v. Kaplan, supra note 5, where the opinion
of the court does not even take notice of the defendant's objection that plaintiff
had failed to exhaust his remedies.
"The Special Term's opinion in the Brown case, supra note 54, at 561,
70 N. Y. Supp. at 401, approved by both the Appellate Division and the Court
of Appeals, said:
"It is unreasonable that the rules of such an order should compel
appeals through a channel of tribunals where the question involved is one
solely of law, and where vested rights are in the balance."
To the same effect is the Special Term decision (Judge Dunne) in Polin v.
Kaplan, on motion for injunction pendente lite, 135 Misc. 828, 238 N. Y. Supp.
460 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1930) ; and Bray v. Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias,
121 Misc. 764, 202 N. Y. Supp. 219 (Sup. Ct. West. Co. 1923).
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the law of the organization or the law of the land, whether
due to a defect in substance or procedure, the member has
immediate right of recourse to the courts; and this has been
applied to a case where the expulsion was illegal because
without notice or trial."' Exhaustion of remedies is unnecessary also where the organization embarrasses or attempts
to block the appeal. s 2 And where the process of appeals
within the organization is not accompanied by a stay of the
determination against the member, so that during the pendency of the appeals he would be deprived of substantial
property r.ights such as employment, the necessity of exhaustion of remedies is dispensed with.8 3 Furthermore, where
following the order of appeal would be vexatious, such as
where long delay would be involved and the member would4
be placed under the necessity of traveling a great distance,
or where carrying out the order of appeal would be futile, 5
'People v. Order of Foresters, supra note 31. In Knights of Pythias v.
Eskholme, supra note 33, where the court held that the proceedings were irregular in several respects and that, therefore, jurisdiction was lacking, the court
said at 259, 35 Atl. at 1059:
"The want of jurisdiction does away with the obligation to seek
relief by appeal, even when required by the constitution of the lodge in
otherwise proper cases ** * The duty * * * to exhaust remedies * * *
arises only where the association is acting strictly within the scope of
its powers."
In McCantz v. Brotherhood of Painters, supra note 42a, it was held that there
was no need of exhausting internal remedies because the penalties were imposed
upon a reconsideration had without notice to the accused. Similarly in Gilmore
v. Palmer, supra note 31, where the expulsion was illegal because it was without
notice or trial, it was held that internal remedies need not be exhausted. Generally, it is said that internal remedies need be pursued "only when the association has acted strictly within the scope of its powers." Hall v. Morrin, sapra
note 48a. But see Jeane v. Grand Lodge, supra note 77.
"Corregan v. Hay, 94 App. Div. 71, 87 N. Y. Supp. 956 (4th Dept. 1904).
The disciplined member in this case was refused access to records necessary
for the prosecution of his appeal unless he first pay the fine imposed upon him.
'Bricklayers', P. & S. Union v. Bowen, supra note 25 at 863; Neal v.
Hutcheson, 160 N. Y. Supp. 1007 (Sup. Ct. Bromx Co. 1916); O'Connor v.
Aforrin, supra note 77; Sons of Italy v. Supreme Lodge, 125 Misc. 572, 211
N. Y. Supp. 548 (Sup. Ct. X. Y. Co. 1925). Contra Harris v. Detroit Typographical Union, supra note 77 (144 Mich. 422, 108 N. W. 362 (1906)).
Brown v. Supreme Court I. 0. F., supra note 54; Schneider v. Local
Union No. 60, supra note 24.
"Corregan v. Hay, supra note 82, where the appeal would be heard by one
having a personal interest in the matter. Schneider v. Local Union No. 60,
supra note 24; see also Brown v. Supreme Court I. 0. F., supra note 54. Where
the scope of review by a parent body or a tribunal within it is limited, by
"home rule" provisions, to an inquiry whether or not disciplinary action violates
any provision of the constitution and by-laws of the parent body, an appeal
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a member's right of recourse to the courts is complete without the exhaustion of remedies within the organization.
III.
INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION.

The importance of labor unions being properly officered
is in direct proportion to the power of the organization over
its own members and their employers. The selection of the
officers, must, of course, be left to the members. Although
there can be no adequate substitute for wisdom, vigilance
and courage on their part, we must be realistic enough to
recognize that the tendency, in most of our institutions, just
as in our municipalities, is for the unfit and corrupt to attain
control and perpetuate .it by political machines which ignore
all decencies and which are powerful enough to bend the
knees and exact homage even of those whose instincts normally would revolt against such personalities and their deeds
and methods. Therefore, there must be some limitations
imposed by a higher power.
It is obvious that no responsible union office should be
held by anyone who has conflicting interests, actual or potential. For example, one engaged in a business that sells
or caters to the employers of the union's members should be
disqualified. So, too, should be one who is directly or indirectly an employer, particularly if he employ non-union
help. While it would seem that no union would elect to responsible office within it one with such contacts or activities,
the fact is to the contrary.
It should be recognized that union officers are fiduciaries and their conduct should be controlled by the exacting
standards that equity prescribes. Any dealings with the emwould be futile when predicated upon the ground that the disciplinary action
was contrary to the law of the local or the law of the land.
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned exceptions to the general rule, the
general rule is, nevertheless, usually urged by unions in an attempt to defeat
actions against them by disciplined members, not infrequently with effect
adverse to the member, at least in the lower courts. The fact that the general
rule is so frequently stated and the exceptions are lost sight of is an obstacle
to justice in this class of cases.
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ployers that are or may tend to the personal benefit of the
officer is a violation of his duty-whether they be, directly
or indirectly, loans, gifts or benefits of any kind, except, of
course, employment in the regular course of business on a
parity with the other members, without favoritism of any
kind. Exactions from employers, under whatever guise and
whatever may be the purported consideration or purpose
thereof, are intolerable.
The officers of unions handle very large sums of union
funds. Certainly, complete detailed accurate and intelligible
records should be kept of their receipt and disbursement.
Yet., in some cases $10,000 and $5,000 items of cash withdrawn by an officer has no record other than an entry on the
stub of the check book "organization expense" or a similar
notation.
Officers should be required to account to their organizations for their funds. Yet, there have recently been instances
of where no accountings had been rendered and where actions were brought to compel accountings and those were resisted by retaliation in the form of expulsion of the plaintiffs and those cooperating with them, and with all the dilatory tactics in the accounting actions that expensive and
resourceful counsel could summon, and the paradoxical situation is presented of officers spending the funds of the members in a fight against disclosure to them, or those of them
that are interested, of how their money has been used.
There is also the problem of compensation. In the early
stages of the development, officers continue to practice their
trades and administer their offices for considerations other
than material. As unions develop strength and treasuries,
the tendency is to make the offices vocational and to provide
for compensation as such. Perhaps it is in the interest of
the unions to have their officers devote their entire time to
the affairs of the union. But in that event, should the compensation of the officers be out of proportion to the amounts
which they would earn by continuing their trade, or which
their brethren earn?
The writer is not advised as to the usual range of the
salaries paid by unions to their officers. In one case that he
knows, the president and general organizer (who devotes
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only half of his time to the union and is engaged in private
business) receives a salary of $21,800 per year, in addition
to which he has received in the past three or four years,
$55,000 as gifts, and the other officers, of whom there is a
goodly number, receive proportionate salaries. These have
been paid by an organization of approximately 1,200 men,
the most fortunate of whom earn no more than about $5,000
per year when steadily employed. When the compensation
is so high, the temptation for one who has once been elected
to office to perpetuate himself therein is almost irresistible,
by whatever means may be effective to that end.
IV.
REMEDIES.

Doubtlessly, the evils and abuses discussed above should
be remedied. The question is how.
Many of the abuses could be remedied, if the national
leaders of trade unionism were minded so to do. But the
whole movement seems to be permeated with the principle
of "home rule" which leaves to each local union complete
control over its .own affairs and members without interference by the respective federations; and thus there seems to
be no supervisory regulations and no supervision. Indeed,
when disgruntled members attempt to gain the interest or
aid of the officers of the national organizations, they are met
with the statement that such officers are powerless to act.
If the union movement is unable or refuses to maintain
its own houses in order, 6 the only alternative is regulation
by law. Of course, perfection ill not be achieved or even
approximated by that means. But that is no reason for not
prescribing by law proper standards and for providing, as
far as the law can, for the enforcement of the observance of
those standards.
We regulate by law the conduct of banks, insurance companies, pawnbrokers, employment agencies; the administra' The New York World-Telegram, for months, has on its editorial page
directed the attention of the "leaders" of labor to abuses within the locals and
called upon them to act-apparently, to no avail.
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tion of estates, the sale of stock, the breeding of domestic
animals. 8 7 We compel by law the education of our children.
We coerce by law, the observance of health, safety and sanitation standards, in the construction, equipment and maintenance of dwellings and other buildings, preparation and
dispensing of food, maintenance of streets and public conveyances, etc. We prohibit monopolies. We regulate public
utilities. Why should we not regulate trade unions?
With respect to workers, we have strict laws and a labor
department to force the furnishing of safe, clean and tolerably comfortable and properly equipped places to work in,
and to regulate the working hours and conditions of women
and children; we compel medical treatment and compensation for industrial injuries and disabilities. We protect the
workmen by law with respect to many of his relations with
his employers. Why should he not be protected in those of
his relations with his fellow workers upon which his livelihood depends?
The time has come for a Trade Union Act which should,
inter alia (1) prohibit the requirement of any but nominal
-say not more than $100-initiation or other admission fee
or charge; (2) prohibit classification of, or discrimination
between, members and associates of a union, so that all shall
be members with complete parity of rights, privileges and
obligations, except that priorities may be established in the
assignment to positions dependent upon the experience of
the men, age of membership in the union, and/or home status,
that is whether with or without dependents, and except that
the amount of dues and assessments may be fixed on a percentage of the members' earnings but the percentage should
be uniform to all except that it may be graduated upwards;
(3) prohibit the fining or other penalization, suspension or
expulsion of any member except for acts specifically prohibited by the Constitution or By-Laws of the union and
made punishable thereby, and provided such prohibitions are
not contrary to law and are reasonably necessary to the efficient fulfillment of the union's proper purposes or to its
proper functioning; (4) prohibit discipline of any kind for
'§§95

(L. 1922, c. 48, amended by L. 1925, c. 38), 97, 105, and 105a, THE
of the State of New York.
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any act in the discharge of a member's duties or rights as
a citizen or resident or official of his country, state or municipality, including resort to, or testimony before, court or
governmental commission, body or official; (5) prohibit discipline for statements, written or oral, wherever made, reflecting on the organization or any of its officers or members;
(6) provide that no member be fined, suspended, expelled
or in any way penalized except after the preferment of
charges in writing, the delivery of a copy thereof to him, a
trial, upon due notice to the accused and all persons entitled
to sit in judgment, before the organization or a committee of
unbiased persons designated by it or before a tribunal provided therefor in the union's constitution or by-laws, at which
trial there shall be received and considered only evidence
presented in the presence of the accused (except in case of
his default), and at which the union shall require the attendance of such of its members as the accused shall ask
be called as witnesses, and at which the accused shall be afforded full opportunity to cross-examine and defend, and
compliance with all the applicable provisions of the Act and
also of the union's constitution and by-laws not inconsistent
with law; (7) provide that every member of the trial committee who participates in the trial shall take oath at the
inception thereof that he has no bias against the accused or
any prejudgment of the charges and that he will faithfully
and fairly hear and examine the matters in controversy and
render a just decision thereon according to the best of his
understanding; (8) provide that where the constitution and
by-laws require that the report of the trial tribunal be passed
on at a meeting of the organization or a body thereof other
than the trial board, the latter shall report in writing a
summary of the proof adduced and their findings and decision thereof, and that due notice that the matter would come
up for consideration be given to all persons entitled to attend; (9) provide that a true and correct stenographic record of the proceedings at the trial and subsequent thereto
be taken and kept by a duly certified shorthand reporter
sworn as to his disinterestedness and the proper performance
of his task; (10) provide for a court review of the proceedings and determination, with power in the court to enjoin
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peizdente lite the union from giving any force or effect to its
decision, and with the right in the court to require a trial
de novo before it when it deems same in the interest of justice; (11) prohibit a member who is himself an employer
of labor or who has conflicting interests of the kind indicated
above, from holding office in the union; (12) prohibit an officer from, directly or indirectly, exacting compensation or
accepting gratuities from members, except salaries duly
voted to him; (13) limit the compensation paid to any one
officer to not more than the maximum earned by the best
paid member in the pursuit of the trade of the members;
(14) prohibit an officer from, directly or indirectly, having
any dealings or transactions of benefit to himself or persons
of interest to him (other than the membership of the union),
with the employers of the members, and from receiving from
them gratuities, compensation or benefits of any kind; (15)
require the officers to keep books and records of account,
in customary form, which would accurately and in detail
account for the union's funds; (16) provide that such books
and records shall be open and available to members; (17)
require the officers to render full financial reports at least
semi-annually; (18) provide that the violation of the several
provisions of the Act shall be crimes and prescribe appropriate penalties.
Some of the suggested provisions are debatable. Probably some items of equal importance have been overlooked,
such as, the subject of election of officerg and the review
thereof. The above outline is but an effort to set forth concretely the type of Act which the trade union movement
needs for its own health: a bill of rights for the individual
worker and a halter for the union "boss."
COPAL AIINTZ.
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